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Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Repealing the Exemption for "Routine
Government Action" Payments
Alexandros Zervos*
Abstract: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) exempts
small scale payments for "routine government action "from its reach.
This articlesuggests that the FCPA be amended to forbid these payments
as well. As currently formulated, the FCPA does not address the very
real damage caused by low-level corruption. Amending it to include
small scale bribes would lead to symbolic and practical benefits that
outweigh any potential objections. This is particularly the case if the
change is accompaniedwith a modified enforcement andpenalty scheme.
I.

Introduction

Contemporary narratives of corruption cast it as a significant
challenge to both the international community and individual countries,
especially developing ones. Corruption is linked to reductions in
domestic and international investment, increases and skewing of
government investment; increases in income inequality; and various
other negative impacts.' Given the damage caused by corruption, efforts
to encourage economic development, improve governance and create
dynamic civil society institutions have increasingly focused on ways to
eliminate it. 2 Developed countries have undertaken significant legal
reforms to aid this effort. However, the legal framework that addresses
* Alexandros Zervos is a 2005 graduate of Yale Law School. He is currently an
associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore and will be clerking for Judge Judith W. Rogers
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia starting in August
2007.
1. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Corruptionand Development: A Review of Issues, 35
J. ECON. LIT. 1320, 1320 (1997); Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development:
Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? 8-14 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 2048, 1998).
2. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufnann, Governance and Corruption, in THE QUALITY OF
GROWTH (2000).
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this problem in the United States and other developed countries suggests
a more complicated understanding of how harmful corruption is than
these countries' rhetoric at first suggests. This "nuanced" understanding
places a great emphasis on large-scale corruption, related to extraordinary events like the awarding of government contracts. The
everyday corruption that directly affects the texture of daily life-small
payments to corrupt officials to do the job they are supposed to doappears to spark much less concern.
The archetypical example of this dichotomy is the United States
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).3 Passed in 1977, the FCPA
criminalizes bribery outside the United States by U.S. citizens,
corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. 4 Though groundbreaking at
the time it was passed, U.S. pressure has meant that the FCPA's
provisions were basically copied and extended by an Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) anti-corruption
convention, 5 with the result that numerous industrialized countries have
changed their laws to criminalize bribery of foreign officials by their
citizens and corporations.6 Once a unique national effort, the general
framework of the FCPA is now an important template for global anticorruption efforts. This globalization of the FCPA's policy priorities is
positive in many respects. However, the generally uncompromising
FCPA framework explicitly exempts payments meant to secure the
performance of "routine government action" ("grease" money) from its
scope.7 This exemption has been adopted by the OECD Convention's
commentaries and has thus been standardized in many global anticorruption frameworks. 8
3. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-3 (1977) for the
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.
4. Id. at § 78dd-1, 2 (1977).
5. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, art. 1, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4 (1998) [hereinafter OECD
Convention].
6. See, e.g., Nora M. Rubin, Comment, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global
Efforts to Curb Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The
Legal Implications of the OECD Recommendations and Conventionfor the United States,
Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 257, 257 (1998) (noting that in
countries where "legal persons" are not subject to criminal sanctions, the treaty calls for
non-criminal sanctions to be imposed).
7. FCPA § 78dd-l(b) (2000).
8. OECD Convention, supra note 5, at Commentaries
9. The Commentaries'
incorporation is not required in implementing legislation, but ten of the thirty-five
countries (including the United States and Korea) signing the OECD Convention have
explicitly incorporated the exemption for low-level administrative payments. See OECD,
KOREA: PHASE 2 REPORT 29 (2004) ("Article 3.2.b of the FBPA provides a defense where
a 'small pecuniary or other advantage is promised, given or offered to a foreign public
official engaged in ordinary and routine work, in order to facilitate the legitimate

20061

AMENDING THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

The FCPA exemption is important to consider because of the
significant negative impact it has on the campaign to reduce global
corruption. As this article discusses, the FCPA exemption can make
U.S. and global rhetoric about the importance of eliminating corruption
seem hypocritical, inward-looking and self-interested. In addition, the
propagation of the exemption for administrative bribery has the potential
of convincing other countries and decision makers seeking to learn from
U.S. and OECD examples that suppressing administrative bribery should
But, as this article underscores,
not be a significant priority.
administrative corruption causes serious damage to the economy and the
investment climate and should not be abandoned to the backwaters of
policy priorities. Recent studies have documented high costs (in terms of
both time and money) for firms subjected to demands for bribes. These
performance of the official's business."' This defense is intended to implement
Commentary 9 on the Convention concerning "small facilitation payments"); Denmark,
OECD, DENMARK: PHASE 1 REPORT 3 (2000) ("Denmark explains that [it means] to
exclude 'small facilitation payments' as contemplated in Commentary 9 on the
Convention"); Canada, OECD, CANADA: PHASE I REPORT 6 (1999) ("Subsection 3(4)
exempts from the ambit of the offence payments, etc. that are made 'to expedite or secure
the performance by a foreign public official of any act of a routine nature that is part of
the foreign public official's duties or functions ... ');Slovakia, OECD, SLOVAK
REPUBLIC: PHASE 1 REPORT 4 (2003) ("The Slovak authorities confirm that 'gifts of very
small value' are meant to cover facilitation payments as defined in paragraph 9 of the
Commentaries"); Sweden, OECD: SWEDEN: PHASE 1 REPORT 4 (1999) ("In addition, in
accordance with Commentary 9, 'small facilitation payments' do not constitute 'improper
reward'); Norway, OECD, NORWAY: PHASE 1 REPORT 3-4 (1999) ("The Norwegian
authorities confirm that the word 'illegally' would give the prosecution discretion to not
prosecute the giving of facilitation payments"); New Zealand, OECD, NEW ZEALAND:
PHASE 1 REPORT 8 (2002) ("Section 105 C subsection 3 paragraphs a) and b) of the
Crimes (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Amendment Act 2001 provides a defence in
relation to an act committed for the sole purpose of ensuring or expediting the
performance by a foreign public official of a 'routine government action' where the
benefit is 'small"'); Australia, OECD, AUSTRALIA: PHASE 1 REPORT 6 (1999) ("Section
70.4 of the Criminal Code amendments provides a defence to the offence under section
70.2 in relation to 'facilitation payments,' which must be raised and argued by the
defendant"); Switzerland, OECD: SWITZERLAND, PHASE 1 REPORT 5 (2000) ("Article 322
of the Criminal Code provides the offence of bribery 'for the commission or omission of
any act in relation to [the] official activity [of the official] contrary to his duties or in the
exercise of his discretionary powers.' Pursuant to this provision, it seems that the
implementing legislation does not apply to all cases where the undue advantage is
offered, promised or given to foreign public officials in order that they carry out the
duties of their functions. In the opinion of the Swiss authorities ...it is in conformity
with Commentar[y] ...9 (on small 'facilitation' payments) of the Convention"). Other
countries allow exemptions based on the Convention text but without specific statutory
provision. See, e.g., OECD, GREECE: PHASE 1 REPORT 3 (1999). Other signatories, like
France, ban all bribes, including facilitation payments. See, OECD: FRANCE: PHASE 1
REPORT 6 (2000). While the exemption for administrative bribes is not universal among
OECD countries, the portion of countries adopting the exemption is sufficient to
constitute a significant and worrying trend, especially as many of them are home to
important multinationals.
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studies have also identified significant negative impacts from
administrative bribery on general business environments. Especially
given the broad-ranging bribery ban currently in place, the administrative
bribe exemption is of limited practical benefit to foreign investors.
Taking into account the negative impact of administrative
corruption, the relatively limited practical benefit of the exemption for
"grease" money and the great symbolic disadvantage the exemption
creates, this article suggests that the United States repeal the FCPA
exemption for administrative corruption and lobby for understandings of
the OECD Convention to be amended accordingly. 9 This could create
significant losses and inconvenience for U.S. companies, including
losses of business to foreign competitors as well as reduced efficiency of
current international operations. United States authorities will also need
to consider whether focusing on this type of corruption is the best use of
the scarce resources they can devote to this issue. Still, the potential
global benefits are significant enough to outweigh these concerns.
Eliminating the exemption for low-level administrative payments in the
FCPA and having the U.S. lobby for changes on a global level could
mark the start of a new crackdown on administrative corruption and an
increase in efforts to fight corruption at all levels. Because passage of
the FCPA eventually led to a significant increase in international efforts
to fight corruption, amending the FCPA to make it more coherent and
effective is a logical and necessary extension of a new global attack on
corruption.
This article is divided into a number of sections. Section II
describes the history of the FCPA, discusses the law's structure, and
provides a brief survey of academic work dissecting and responding to it.
Section III examines the practical impact of the FCPA-both in terms of
actual criminal prosecutions and the symbolic support that it provides to
anti-corruption efforts-in order to understand what its actual function is.
Section IV specifically focuses on administrative corruption and the
harm that it causes. While administrative corruption does not exactly fit
the formal exemption contained in the FCPA, it is sufficiently related to
be a good rough guide to the damage caused by bribes like those
exempted from U.S. criminal prosecution by the FCPA. Section V
considers whether it is possible to further subdivide the low-level
9. See infra Section V for a discussion of the potential of subdividing the
administrative bribery currently allowed by the FCPA. However, analysis of most
plausible subdivisions of these payments quickly reveals that they are either too difficult
to actually employ, or that subdivision would not help isolate more and less harmful
payment types. Section V's analysis suggests that attempts to simply amend the scope of
the FCPA's current exemption would not be effective at reducing the harmful effects of
these payments.
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administrative payments currently allowed by the FCPA in a way that
would differentiate between more and less harmful corruption. Section
VI proposes amending the FCPA to eliminate the exemption for lowlevel facilitation payments, briefly surveys the benefits this could bring,
and reviews potential objections to removing the exemption. Section VII
considers ways in which low-level administrative bribes differ from
other types of corruption, and outlines penalty and enforcement schemes
that specifically address these unique characteristics. Finally, Section
VIII provides some concluding thoughts on how amending the FCPA
relates to broader issues surrounding this type of lawmaking.
II.
A.

The FCPA's History and Operation
History

The FCPA was originally passed by the U.S. Congress in 1977 in
response to a number of scandals involving U.S. corporations bribing
foreign government officials to secure government contracts and other
benefits to themselves.' 0 It aims to both criminalize bribery of foreign
officials by U.S. corporations and to require certain accounting standards
and internal controls from these corporations. Initially, the FCPA
(created as part of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act)" was limited to
securities issuers and "domestic concerns"' 2 and required a "territorial
nexus" with the United States.' 3 From its passage, the FCPA included an
exemption for "grease" payments,14 and in 1988, it was amended to5
provide additional structural protections to U.S. businesses.
10. These incidents of bribery came to light after investigations of corporate
corruption following the Watergate scandal.
See generally Alejandro Posadas,
Combating Corruption Under InternationalLaw, 10 DuKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 34955 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of MultinationalEnterprises:An
Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality,andHarmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 5,
17 (2003); Tamara Adler, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of
1977: A Step Toward Clarification and Consolidation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1740, 1740 (1982).
11. Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 683, 683
(2003); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd- I (1977).
12. FCPA § 78dd-1 (1977).
13. Id.
14. See Adler, supra note 10, at 1751-52.
15. These added affirmative defenses and included a call for the U.S. government to
pressure trading partners to adopt similar laws. See, e.g., Perkel, supra note 11, at 68385. The defenses allow payments as long as they are in line with written laws and/or are
not given for a "corrupt purpose." Id. at 697-98. In addition, the exception for "grease"
payments was changed so that the wording referred to "routine government actions"-a
change that expanded the range of possible bribes. See James Hines, Forbidden
Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977 5, 21 (NBER, Working
Paper No. 5266, 1995).
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Subsequent amendments in 1998 broadened the scope of the Act,
removing the need for a territorial nexus with the United States (and thus
increasing the ability to prosecute subsidiaries of domestic firms), as well
as criminalizing the act of bribery
"by any person" rather than just
16
issuers and "domestic concerns."'
The FCPA has been characterized as a major burden to U.S.
businesses facing corrupt foreign competitors. Mickey Cantor, a U.S.
Trade Representative under President Clinton, estimated that complying
with the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions cost U.S. firms upwards of $45
billion in one year alone. 17 Other commentators also argued that the
FCPA constituted a significant drag on U.S. firms' profitability. 8 In
response to these pressures, the U.S. amended the FCPA in 1988 to
include certain affirmative defenses against bribery sanctions. 19 In
addition, the U.S. government became a major sponsor of attempts to
punish bribery by firms based in other countries.2 °
The United States' efforts to have other countries copy its efforts
were successful, and were rewarded when a new OECD anti-bribery
convention came into effect on February 15, 1999. 2 1 This Convention
16. See FCPA § 78dd-1(g) (2000) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(i) (2000) (for domestic
concerns).
17. See Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10. While the actual estimates quoted in official
speeches are subject to dispute, the size of damage Cantor discussed indicates official
concern about the issue. More detailed estimates have tried to identify the impact of the
FCPA on U.S. exports in particular industries. In the aircraft sector, one study suggested
that sales in high corruption countries dropped 21.2%, significantly more than the 6.4%
drop in low corruption countries, in the years immediately following passage of the
FCPA. See Hines, supra note 15, at 17.
18. See, e.g., Robert S. Levy, The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct of 1977: Are They Really As Valuable as we Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 71, 78-83 (1985); John W. Duncan, Comment, Modifying The Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct: The Searchfor a Common Standard,4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203, 206-09
(1982); Adler, supra note 10, at 1746.
19. See FCPA § 78dd-l(c) (2000) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(c) (1994) (for domestic
concerns); § 78dd-3(c) (2000) (for "any person").
20. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 17. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424 (1988) provides:
(1) Negotiations. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should
pursue the negotiation of an international agreement, among the members of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, to govern
persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers
and domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section. Such
international agreement should include a process by which problems and
conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved.
This effort meant making significant changes to accepted ways of doing business. For
example, prior to Switzerland's accession to the OECD Convention, Swiss firms were
able to write off foreign bribes as business expenses on their tax returns. See Elizabeth
Olson, Swiss Toughen Anti-Laundering Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at C4.
21. See William M. Daley, Bribery: No Longer Business as Usual, FmN. TIMES, Feb.
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marked the culmination of strong U.S. lobbying efforts and coincided
with an upswing in attacks on corruption.
Pressured by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Transparency International (TI)
as well as the U.S. government, international organizations (lOs) like the
World Bank began to both fund increasing numbers of anti-corruption
programs and to consider levels of corruption when making more general
funding decisions.22 Importantly, almost all OECD governments rapidly
ratified the anti-corruption convention. 23
Compliance with anticorruption requirements was said to vary significantly,24 but even
countries that provided very significant tax benefits to corporate bribers
appeared to take a harder line in at least some cases.25
While on an international level the OECD Convention has gained
importance, the FCPA continues to be significant both practically and
symbolically. Practically, its provisions govern the behavior of U.S.
companies, whose activities constitute a significant portion of global
foreign investment. 26 Even more importantly, as the forerunner and
inspiration for the OECD Convention, the FCPA serves as both a
benchmark for other countries and as an indicator of the anti-corruption
priorities of the United States.
B. PracticalImpact
The practical and symbolic importance of the FCPA makes it
important to understand its provisions-both what it covers and what it
does not. There has also been significant academic commentary about
the FCPA. While much commentary discusses its impact on business,
other pieces have suggested changing specific aspects to make it more
effective.
The FCPA currently deals with two major areas: specified
accounting/reporting/internal control standards 27 and the prohibition on

15, 1999, at 10.
22. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 276-77, 280; West Africa: Corruption in ChadCameroon Pipeline to be Monitoredby TI and Non-profit Body, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 10,
2003.
23. See Perkel, supra note 11, at n.6.
24. See, e.g., David L. Heifetz, Comment, Japan's Implementation of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention: Weaker and Less Effective Than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 11 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 209, 209 (2002).
25. See Olson, supra note 20; Suzanne Daley, French Oil Executive Calls
Commissions Routine, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at A6.
26. In 2003, U.S. outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows constituted more
than 25% of the total. See UNCTAD, COUNTRY FACT SHEET: UNITED STATES (2004),
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditedir/docs/wir05_fs-us.en.pdf
(last
visited July 14, 2006).

27. FCPA §§ 78m(a), (b)(2004).
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the provision of bribes to foreign "official(s)," "political part(ies)" and/or
third persons who will pass on bribes to these entities, for the purposes of
28
"influencing" them in any way or securing an "improper advantage."
These prohibitions are absolute within U.S. territory and apply to all U.S.
nationals outside the United States. 29 Firms and individuals can face
criminal prosecution and civil actions from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) (in the case of firms not registered under the Exchange Act) and
civil action from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (SEC
enforcement applies only to companies registered under the Exchange
Act).3 °
The FCPA allows gifts/payments that are considered legal under the
written laws of foreign countries, or which serve a bona fide non-corrupt
purpose. To help firms navigate these areas, the FCPA requires the DOJ
to issue advisory opinions on the legality of certain payments (and in
some cases encourages firms to seek these, especially in the case of bona
fide payments).3 '
The FCPA's provisions are genuinely tough; individual violators
face imprisonment and fines of up to $1,000.32 However, the FCPA does
have significant omissions. One of these omissions is the fact that there
is no private right of action. Generally only the DOJ can initiate criminal
prosecutions, so individuals and organizations with evidence of corrupt
activity must provide their information to the DOJ for enforcement.33
Given that there have been relatively few prosecutions for FCPA
violations since its inception (with many firms investigated settling
rather than going to trial), this leaves open the risk that many violators
may escape without prosecution.34
A second omission, and the focus of this article, is a specific
"[e]xception for routine government action." This exempts "facilitating"
or "expediting" payments meant to "expedite or to secure the
performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official,
political party, or party official. 35 Though the statute includes no
28. Id. at § 78dd-l(A)(3)(Ai).
29. See Perkel, supra note 11, at 694.
30. Id. at 699-700.
31. FCPA § 78dd-1(d) (1998).
32. See Perkel, supra note 11, at 701-4.
33. Id. at 699-700; there are some limited circumstances where private rights of
action are available. See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical
Analysis of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 231 (1997).
34. See, e.g., Salbu supra note 33, at 236; Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and
DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations:
The Triton Energy/IndonesiaSEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
305, 305 (1998); Leslie Eaton, Triton Energy Settles Indonesia Bribery Case for
$300,000, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at D2.
35. See FCPA § 78dd-l(b) (2000) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(b) (2000) (for domestic
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mention of any caps on payments, these have in practice been limited to
$1,000 or less when actually reviewed.3 6 At its core, this text explicitly
states that certain types of bribery will not cause the payer legal problems
in the United States.
C. CriticalResponses to the FCPA
Academic literature dealing with the legalities of the FCPA extends
from critiques about its impact on business and general effectiveness, to
more specific critiques of specific individual provisions and suggestions
for change.
Some commentators complain that the Act and its
ambiguities do little to curb corruption but much to chill business and/or
to steer it to non-U.S. competitors.37 Others question whether the ban on
payments is culturally imperialist.3 8 The 1988 amendments, which
specifically allowed payments permitted by written laws in the
39
jurisdictions where they were made, addressed some of these concerns. 40
More recent articles have examined actual enforcement of the FCPA
and the implementation of the OECD Convention, commenting
specifically about problems of differential enforcement by countries for
which corruption outside national borders is not a major concern. 41
Certain critiques have recommended specific changes to the FCPA,
such as incorporating a private right of action into the law.42 Other
reviews have been more general, including some summary discussion of
the FCPA's exception for facilitation payments. A particular focus of
general criticism, and specifically of the facilitation payment exception,
is its ambiguous nature. It is not clear exactly which payments would
qualify as facilitation payments and which would be held to contravene

concerns); § 78dd-3(b) (2000) (for "any person").
36. See Perkel, supra note 11, at 697.
37. See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 33, at 261-71; Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Note,
Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Unnecessary Costs of Fighting
Corruption?,61 LA. L. REv. 861, 868-81 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Salbu supra note 33, at 275-79; Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The
1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral
Imperialism?, 1 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 14, 14 (2000).
39. See Perkel, supra note 11, at 683, 697.
40. See, e.g, Mathews, supra note 34; Salbu supra note 33; Agnieszka Klich, Note,
Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 121, 123-24 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Barbara C. George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus in
Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM.
Bus. L. J. 485, 515-24 (2000); Haifetz, supra note 24.
42. See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a
PrivateRight of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 185 (1994). Other commentators suggest
various other solutions. See, e.g., Salbu supra note 33, at 280-87; Taylor supra note 37,
at 881-86.
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the FCPA for reasons of size or actual purpose. These types of critiques
generally suggest clarifying the FCPA rather than completely eliminating
the facilitation payments exception.43
III. Impact of the FCPA
In order to understand the impact and actual operation of the FCPA,
it is important to review some cases in which this law has played a role.
While they are not numerous, the actions against business executives
accused of bribery outside the U.S. provide a useful guide to the types of
behavior that actually lead (or do not lead) to legal sanctions, to the
problems in implementing this legislation, and to FCPA provisions that
address these problems. More substantially, they carry significant
symbolic content as a both a deterrent to other companies, and as an
example to other countries and companies. Full court cases with guilty
verdicts constitute only part of the FCPA enforcement narrative (many
companies plead guilty to avoid the extra sanctions of a guilty verdict).
It is also important to consider settlements and investigations, which
provide additional insight into both investigator motivation and company
priorities.
A. Legal Choices and Actual Prosecutions
SEC and DOJ enforcement of the FCPA has been uneven, with
FCPA enforcement appearing to be a relatively low priority for certain
administrations in particular. 4 The reasons for this lack of enforcement
could include a desire by various administrations to avoid creating extra
obstacles for American business expansion abroad and the difficulties in
assigning responsibility for activities conducted abroad. Many of the
cases illustrate different ways the FCPA attempts to deal with these
problems-and thus underscore the problems' existence. The relatively
small number of cases brought also underscores the importance of the
FCPA's symbolic dimensions.
One way the FCPA attempts to address the problems of proving
actual bribery abroad is a relatively extensive set of accounting
regulations 45 which focus not so much on the act of bribery as on efforts
to conceal it. Prosecutors use companies' attempts to hide bribes through
dubious accounting to punish bribery attempts they would otherwise
have difficulty proving.4 6
This technique means that on first
43. See, e.g., Taylor supra note 37, at 874-77, 881-86.
44. See Mathews, supra note 34, at 305; Eaton supra note 34, at D2.
45. See FCPA §§ 78m(a), (b) (2004).
46. This roundabout route to law enforcement is not a new technique. For example,
Al Capone was not convicted for violating laws restricting the consumption of alcohol,
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examination, many of the cases involve seemingly mundane
misallocation or awkward contortions of accounting categories. 47 For
example, in United States v. Rothrock,4 8 the Vice President of the Cooper
Division of the Allied Products Corporation pleaded guilty to preparing a
"false invoice." This mundane sounding offense actually involved
bribing a Russian firm to buy his company's products in a complicated
transaction involving Swiss companies and a non-existent marketing
study. 49 A significant portion of the FCPA cases that are brought rely on
accounting provisions like those involved in the Rothrock case.
A second tool of the FCPA, when attempting to overcome the
challenges of proving violations by U.S. companies, is to hold parent
corporations directly responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries. A
good example of this liability was the SEC's seeking civil injunctive and
civil penalty enforcement against Triton Energy, on the basis of actions
by its subsidiary, Triton Indonesia.50 Unusually invoking the anti-bribery
as well as the accounting provisions of the FCPA, the SEC held Triton
Energy responsible for the decisions of two Triton Indonesia executives
to authorize payments to an agent who then went on to bribe Indonesian
government officials to lower its tax bill and deal with other regulatory
problems the business was facing. 5' The SEC prosecuted Triton Energy
despite its admission that Triton Energy officials had never given explicit
authorization for the payment of the bribe money. All of the negotiations
were conducted via Triton Indonesia, with all of its assets and people
found outside the United States.52 Triton Energy and its employees
eventually consented to permanent injunctive relief and civil monetary
penalties.53
This approach is certainly useful, and is strong
encouragement to companies considering toughening internal audit and
compliance rules. However, it still requires that the SEC or the DOJ
collect evidence about the actions of the subsidiaries before bringing a
case to court (the Triton investigation itself took several years to
complete and the case began in 1997, about six years after the last bribe
involved in the case was paid).54
but for not paying taxes on these profits. See Symposium, Jeffrey Rosen, Security,
Technology and IndividualRights: 2003, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 27 (2003).
47. See Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: The Accounting and
Record-Keeping Provisions, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L LAW & PRAC. 1, available at WL
N02FCPB ABA-LGLED C-1.
48. United States v. Rothrock, 4 FCPA Rep. 699.818801 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
49. See Deming, supra note 47.
50. See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) f 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
51. See id.; Mathews, supra note 34, at 357-70.
52. Mathews, supra note 34, at 357-58, 366-67.
53. Id. at 366-67.
54. Id. at 366.
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A second notable aspect of the Triton case was that the SEC had
evidence that Triton Indonesia had engaged in long-term "greasing" of
low-level individuals to ensure the timely processing of monthly crude
oil invoices. The SEC did not prosecute Triton for these payments
(presumably because they were covered by the "routine administrative
action" exception), though it did add additional charges dealing with
Triton's attempts to hide the payments through improper accounting.5 5
These "grease" payments had occurred immediately before and during
the period where the major bribery investigation began (the end of the
1980s and the early 1990s) 56-- demonstrating that the corrupt culture of
Triton Indonesia clearly extended to corruption at all levels, and
challenging the idea that high-level and administrative bribery are
distinct.
B. Symbolic Impact
The relative rarity of enforcement actions under the FCPA,57 the
difficulties in enforcement which even the law's structure betrays,58 and
the indignant context in which it was passed 59 all underscore the fact that
one of the major purposes of the FCPA's prohibitions on bribery is to
serve as a symbolic articulation of anti-corruption norms, rather than to
simply constitute an additional tool in prosecutors' arsenal.
As previously outlined, violations of the FCPA result in real
prosecutions. Still, even these can be seen as part of an effort to spread
the fundamental symbolic message implied by the FCPA, rather than to
significantly decrease the level of corruption one prosecution at a time.
The overall message implied by the emphasis on accounting information,
on holding parent companies responsible for the actions of their
subsidiaries, and even of structures like DOJ pre-opinions on the legality
of certain payments, 60 is one of deterrence. The FCPA is designed to
encourage companies to monitor their global activities closely and to
articulate and enforce strong anti-corruption norms through internal
compliance systems. The criminal prosecutions that do occur serve as an
additional stick by which to convince companies of the advisability of
adopting these measures.
When considering whether to eliminate the FCPA's "grease"
payments exemption, the actual role of the FCPA is of primary

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 365-66.
Id.
See Eaton, supra note 34; Mathews, supra note 34, at 305.
See discussion in supra Section III.A.
See Posadas, supra note 10, at 349-55.
FCPA § 78dd-l(e)(1) (2004).
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importance. The most important question that needs to be answered is
not whether facilitation payments can be eliminated through individual
prosecutions by U.S. authorities, but rather whether these payments are
actually harmful and, if they are, whether the level of harm is high
enough to justify including them in the anti-corruption norm that the
FCPA expresses.
IV.

Impact of Exemption

There are two major negative impacts from the exclusion of
"grease" money from the FCPA. First, the exclusion encourages
additional use of administrative bribes by major corporations. Second, it
carries important symbolic connotations-that the United States (and
developed countries in general) cares only about certain types of bribery
in developing countries, either for reasons of national interest or because
"small scale" bribery is not destructive. Before considering these effects
though, it is necessary to outline the destructive impact that many
economists assign to "small scale" bribery. Only then is the full damage
caused by the exclusion of "grease" money from the FCPA appreciable.
A.

Economic Impact of GreaseMoney

The exclusion of "grease" money/administrative payments from the
FCPA was adopted as a way of improving the competitiveness of U.S.
firms abroad that had been handicapped by the inability to respond to
foreign firms' bribery and/or improve their ability to make other
countries' bureaucracies move faster. 61 The presence of the exemption
strongly suggests that administrative corruption and small scale
payments are also not considered on the same scale as the large payments
that are banned by the FCPA. This is in line with the views of certain
academics who have suggested that small scale bribery is not a very
important concern, or may indeed simply be a cultural practice not
familiar to western businesses and thus needlessly categorized as
harmful.62 However, the majority of economic and development experts
61. See 123 CONG. REc. 38604-2, 38778, 36304 (statements of Senator Tower,
Congressman Devine, and Congressman Eckhardt, respectively); Foreign Corrupt
Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure Hearings on S. 305 Before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1
(1977).
62. See, e.g., Frances Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 760, 760 (1985). Lui makes the argument that in some cases bribery can mean the
most efficient allocation of resources (e.g. to those who need them most). From a
practitioners standpoint, George Moody-Stuart suggests that "small gifts" (generally
defined as 2% of the value of a contract or $20,000, whichever is less), should be allowed
without question. See George Moody-Stuart, GRAND CORRUPTION 59-60 (1997).
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who have studied the subject do not agree.6 3 These experts argue that
"small scale" bribery is extremely harmful, with some firms' payment of
"grease" money increasing the pressure on other firms to pay themwith the result that all firms waste additional time engaging with
bureaucrats as part of the bribery payment and avoidance dance.
Additional studies have argued that these administrative payments do not
actually increase firm growth, but are rather a result of pressure from
bureaucrats. Some economists go further than this-they argue that
administrative corruption at a low level may be even more harmful than
concentrated, high-level corruption. While these studies do not establish
the exact relation between "grease" payments and other forms of
corruption, they do refute the implication that the "grease" payments
authorized by the FCPA are relatively harmless.
One key study of administrative corruption, co-authored by the head
of the World Bank's governance programs, relevantly considers whether
"Grease Money Speeds Up the Wheels of Commerce. ' 64 Using surveys
of global corporations, this study found a positive correlation between
bribe payments and official harassment (e.g. time wasted with
bureaucracy, regulatory burden etc.), suggesting that overall, paying
bribes did not decrease the level of official harassment for firms on an
economy-wide basis.65 Rather, the authors suggest that bureaucrats can
use the willingness of firms to pay bribes to extract an even higher level
of rents than they would otherwise be able to. 66 This low-level
harassment and time-wasting is exactly the type of burden that the
FCPA's exemptions on "grease" money seem designed to avoid. On an
individual level, firms' decisions to pay bribes can make sense. On an
economy wide level, the ability/willingness of firms to pay small scale
bribes contributes to a large-scale problem where the entire economy's
growth rate is reduced by additional resources spent engaging and
satisfying the bureaucracy. The study's authors conclude that "the
business community as a whole can benefit from international laws that
strengthen their ability to credibly commit to no-bribery... [s]uch laws
63. Generally, these studies discuss issues like "grease" money, small scale
corruption and administrative corruption, rather than sticking to the exact language of the
FCPA and its subsequent interpretations. Still, the general category of payment being
discussed is the same, making the use of these studies valid for considering the general
issue of "grease" money.
64. See Daniel Kauffman and Shang-Jin Wei, Does Grease Money Speed Up the
Wheels of Commerce?, (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2254, 1998). Ironically, the
paper makes approving reference to the FCPA's general prohibition on corruption in
discussing its conclusion that administrative payments are harmful-the exact category of
bribes which the FCPA is less stringent in enforcing.
65. Id. at 8-12, 15-16.
66. Id. at 15.
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may not only reduce bribe payment, but may also reduce the actual
harassment firms face in equilibrium. 6 7
The problematic nature of administrative bribery is also
demonstrated by a more extensive study of state capture conducted by
the World Bank. Examining the results of a major survey in Eastern
Europe, the World Bank experts on governance and corruption found
that firms which paid high levels of administrative action bribes (e.g.
bribes to "get things done" as opposed to influencing the formation of
regulatory and legislative frameworks) suffered from lower levels of
growth and invested less money into their businesses.68 While the causes
of this correlation are acknowledged as complex, the authors' argue that
"[a]dministrative corruption ...would appear... to impose considerable
costs to the firm without any measurable benefits." 69 The same study
found that other forms of corruption could, in certain cases, have
significant benefits to the firms that engaged in them. Administrative
corruption, on the other hand, seemed to benefit only the bureaucrats
who extracted rents.70
Other economists have suggested that low-level type bribes can,
under certain conditions, be more costly and destructive than the
centralized, high-level bribes targeted by the FCPA.7' While those
making this argument admit that corruption is determined by a large
number of variables, they argue that high-level corruption, combined
with a reasonably compliant and paid civil service, can in certain cases
produce less of an impact than uncontrolled corruption at all levels.7 2
This insight into the nature of corruption is confirmed by other
researchers, who discuss differences between India and Suharto-era
Indonesia.73 While the total level of corruption in both countries was
relatively similar, growth rates were much lower in India. This may have
been because corruption in India was more anarchic and non-centralized,
67. Id. at 16.
68. Joel S. Hellman et al., "Seize the State, Seize the Day ": State Capture,
Corruption, and Influence in Transition 19 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2444,
2000).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 17-19. This study included both foreign and domestic firms in the
countries studied. However, the same authors have debunked the idea that foreign firms
might be more "virtuous" than domestic ones, and thus are not subject to the survey's
conclusions. In a companion paper, they found that foreign firms were just as likely to
engage in administrative corruption as domestic firms. See Joel Hellman et al., Are
Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition
Economies?, TRANSITION, May-June-July 2000, at 3.
71. Christopher J. Waller et. al., Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up?, 40 ECON.
INQUIRY 688, 688 (2002).
72. Id. at 688, 699-702.
73. See Bardhan, supra note 1.
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and thus less predictable and more time consuming for firms.74 In some
ways, it can be less costly to firms to make a few dependable, large scale
payments to top officials than to deal with the constant demand for small
scale bribes by low-level officials.7 5
These economic studies, like all others, are not all-encompassing.
The formal economic models they contain are premised on large
numbers of assumptions, and the large surveys used for statistical
information are not specifically focused on the exact conditions specified
by the FCPA. But the overall conclusion of these surveys, and many
other, more general reviews of corruption,76 is that small scale payments
do have a significant cost for the individual firms that pay them, for the
general business environment, and for society as a whole. This absolute
cost is an argument for amending the FCPA to include a ban on "grease"
payments, regardless of whether other types of bribes are more or less
destructive on a comparative basis.
Symbolic Impact

B.

The symbolic impact of the FCPA's exception for "grease"
payments may be even more significant than the additional
administrative payments that result because they are exempted from
coverage under the act. As discussed earlier, the FCPA has been a model
and a standard against which anti-corruption campaigners have measured
themselves (or been pressured to do so by a powerful United States). In
this context, many of the major possible explanations for the current
FCPA exemption for grease payments are destructive. One explanation
would be that the United States does not consider grease payments
particularly problematic, and thus developed countries need not take the
fight against them seriously either. A second explanation would be that
the inconvenience of avoiding low-level corruption is so great that it
outweighs any negative impact on other countries' economies and
societies. A related argument is that the United States feels that
engaging in higher level corruption has problematic impacts on its own
firms (and country), whereas lower level corruption would not do that; it
would only impact other countries. These explanations are overlapping
and complementary, united in detracting from efforts to fight
administrative corruption and in reinforcing negative views of the United

74.

Id. at 1325.

75.

See Andrew Maclntyre, Funny Money: Fiscal Policy, Rent-seeking and

Economic Performance in Indonesia, in RENTS, RENT-SEEKING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 249 (Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram eds., 2000).
76. See, e.g., Wei, supra note 1; Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J.
EcON. 681, 681 (1995).
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States.
The first explanation for the FCPA's exemption of "grease"
payments-that the United States does not consider "grease" payments
particularly problematic-is supported by both the history of the FCPA
and the language of the exemption and its implementation. The FCPA
was passed in response to high-level corruption by U.S. companies,
mostly in order to secure contracts with foreign governments.77 Coming
in the wake of the Watergate scandals, the investigations into corporate
malfeasance focused on the corruption of the very highest public officials
and the damage this did to confidence in the United States business
system. 78 In this context, low-level administrative payments and their
destructive impact were not very relevant to the legislators' actions. This
view is supported by reviewing the language of the exemption and its
implementation. It stops enforcement of the FCPA's provisions while
expediting or securing "routine governmental action '' 79 -basically
distinguishing between firms convincing government officials to do
"what they are supposed to do" and other types of corruption.
The rationales behind the distinctions that the FCPA makes are
appealing at first glance. But, as the studies outlined in the previous
subsection make clear, the "grease" money that the FCPA privileges is
actually highly destructive to both the business environment and to the
successful operation of the actual firms involved. By allowing its
legislation to make the case that administrative corruption is not a serious
(or as serious) a problem as other types of bribery, the United States
plays a destructive role in anti-corruption efforts in other countries and at
an international level. While it is doubtful that those wishing to engage
in bribery would directly point to the United States for justification, it is
very possible that laws to combat corruption would borrow from the
FCPA and include the laxer treatment of administrative corruption. The
real possibility of this was illustrated by the fact that the OECD treaty on
corruption adopted the same exemption to administrative payments as
the FCPA. 80 More generally, the United States' role as a leader in the
anti-corruption movement means that its legal system is widely studied
by anti-corruption experts from other countries, particularly developing
ones. 8 1 Given its relevance to the international community, the FCPA's
77. U.S. Dep't Of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions,
last updated Jan. 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/

dojdocb.htm (last visited July 14, 2006) [hereinafter DOJFCPAAntibribery Provisions];
Klich, supra note 40, at 123-24.
78. Id.
79. FCPA § 78dd-l(b), 2(b) (1998).
80. See OECD Convention, supra note 5.
81. See, e.g., Govt. Studying Steps to Avoid Bribery of University Staff, THE DAILY
YOMIURI, Jun. 1, 1999, at 3; Ethiopia Participatesin Global Forum to Fight Corruption,
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prescriptions and value judgments are likely to be particularly studiedand thus the exemption for "grease" payments has the potential to be
particularly destructive.
A second possible explanation of the FCPA exemption reinforces
the idea of the United States as a hypocrite. Those trying to protect
corruption (and/or attack the United States) can point to the exemption
and claim that it reveals a self-interested and selfish United States that
values the convenience of its own firms rather than the smooth
functioning of other countries' societies. In this scenario (supported by
the text of the FCPA's exemption, with its discussion of "routine
governmental action"), 82 the United States refuses to place its firms in
the (undoubtedly, sometimes inconvenient position) of having to accept
the official channels and delays that normal, law-abiding members of the
public must. While petty bribery is certainly a fact of life in many
countries, 83 the specifically articulated exception for United States
bribers has the potential to aggravate feelings already made raw by the
United States' actions after the September 11 terrorist attacks.84
A third, related argument, is that the FCPA exception reflects a
United States that cares only about its domestic affairs. Under this line
of criticism, the FCPA was passed at a time when the United States was
worried about high-level corruption domestically 85-and that the FCPA
was therefore meant to stop large U.S. companies from becoming
accustomed to high-level bribery abroad. Under this view, the FCPA
exemption would simply exclude types of bribery not held to be
particularly dangerous to the U.S. domestically.
Neither of the last two lines of attack would be as effective if the
United States was quietly content to focus on its internal affairs. After
all, until recently, many European countries allowed tax deductions on
bribery abroad. The difference is that U.S. foreign policy rhetoric
consistently aspires to much higher standards for the United States.
Given its claims to be a "city on the hill," especially with regard to
corruption, the United States is much more vulnerable to accusations of
hypocrisy than other countries. The moralistic rhetoric surrounding
corruption implicitly and explicitly boasts that the United States is more
ethical than the rest of the world. In this context, issues like the FCPA
exemption have the capacity to severely undermine the effectiveness of

ADDIS

TRIBUNE,

Mar. 5, 1999; Michael Sun, Scholar Lauds Anti-graft Academy Move,

NEW STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at 12.

82.
83.
84.
85.

FCPA § 78dd-l(b) (1998).
See, e.g., Klich, supra note 40, at 131-32.
These actions range from the war in Iraq to tightening visa restrictions.
See, e.g., Klich, supra note 40, at 123-24; Adler supra note 10, at 1740-41.
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U.S. foreign policy. 86 At least in the case of corruption, this would be
problematic not just for the United States, but also for the rest of the
world, which would benefit from anti-corruption standards equal to those
U.S. rhetoric lauds.
V.

Classifying Low-Level Administrative Corruption

Corruption is notoriously difficult to define.87 Similarly, it is
difficult to identity the exact parameters of low-level administrative
corruption.8 8 Beyond the vague outlines sketched by the FCPA and the
OECD Convention, little attention has been given to systematically
classifying these low-level bribes. While it could be argued that the
small amounts involved in low-level corruption render any classification
attempt of low value, it is important to conduct such an exercise before
considering a complete ban. Thinking systematically about the various
categories these low-level payments might be classified under helps to
determine whether a total ban on payments is warranted or whether only
some facilitation payments create the serious harms that have been
associated with this type of bribe. More broadly, this exercise can
further illustrate the various ways in which low-level "facilitation"
payments can lead to significant harms that a repeal of the FCPA
exemption would begin to prevent.
In terms of exemptions from prosecution, the FCPA's text refers to
an "[e]xception for routine government action," while the commentary of
the OECD Convention exempts "facilitation payments.., made to

86. For example, on signing amendments to the FCPA, President Clinton stated that:
"The United States has led the effort to curb international bribery. We have long
believed bribery is inconsistent with democratic values, such as good governance and the
rule of law. It is also contrary to basic principles of fair competition and harmful to
efforts to promote economic development." William J. Clinton, Statement by the
President, (Nov. 10, 1998) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
signing.htm (last visited July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Clinton Speech]; Simons, supra note
17; Bill Brock, Prohibit Bribery-Not Exports, CHR. Sc. MON., Sep. 9, 1981, at 22.
("Congress acted in a typically courageous and American fashion when it passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in December 1977"). The FCPA's scope for
undermining U.S. rhetoric is particularly strong given the fact that other major trading
powers, such as France and Japan, choose not to protect their firms with a facilitation
payment exclusion, despite being allowed to by the OECD Convention. See, OECD,
FRANCE: PHASE 1 REPORT 6 (2000); OECD, JAPAN: PHASE 1 REPORT 3 (2002). While this
framework still allows local prosecutors the discretion to ignore corruption, the legal
principle claimed has significant symbolic and rhetorical value.
87. See, e.g., Arvind K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, 15 J. ECON. SuRv., 71, 73
(2001).
88. Indeed, this has been one source of criticism of the FCPA-that its definitions,
including those related to the facilitation payment exemption, are too vague. See, e.g.,
Taylor supra note 37, at 874-77.
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induce public officials to perform their functions."8 9 The FCPA's
exemption has been interpreted to cover only amounts less than $1,000,
although this is not stated in the statute's text.90 However, beyond these
vague parameters there are very few definitions. Using the parameters
provided by the OECD and the FCPA, a first classification attempt of
payments to facilitate routine government action would probably focus
on the amounts involved, and/or the frequency of bribery, as well as the
exact definition of what payments for "routine government action"
actually constitute. More sophisticated classifications might focus on the
"moral" wrong of various payments, the type of activity regulated, the
amounts involved, and the possibility that low-level administrative
bribery would lead to additional corruption. All of these potential
classification systems need to be judged on two distinct factors: how
easily they would allow corrupt payments to be distinguished from each
other, and how useful the resulting classifications would be.
Before beginning to consider how to subdivide the different types of
payments that would be affected by amending the FCPA, it is important
to outline what payments are currently covered by the exemption for
"routine governmental action." 91 While this is a vague term, it is
generally held to cover activities that foreign officials would normally
perform during the course of their duties, and over which they do not
exercise much discretion.9 2 This could include activities like issuing
permits and other documents necessary to do business, providing/
arranging for utility provision, processing requests, and other basic
bureaucratic procedures. Routine governmental action would not include
performing tasks not included as part of an everyday job descriptione.g. waiving mandatory fees or (especially) approving contracts for new
The lines between routine governmental action and
business. 93
new/impermissible business are not always clear-cut. For example,
Value Added Tax (VAT) repayments a U.S. company was legally
entitled to would seem to fall within the scope of the exemption. But,
Justice Department lawyers have indicated that they would consider this
kind of payment problematic-probably because the payment might be
seen as a way of retaining business and possibly because the official
in deciding which company's payments would
would exercise discretion
94
first.
be processed
89. OECD Convention, supra note 5, at Commentaries 9.
90. See Perkel, supra note 11, at 697.
91. FCPA § 78dd-l(b) (2000).
92. See DOJFCPA Antibribery Provisions,supra note 78.
93. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-579, at 921 (1988) (describing the routine governmental
action exception); FCPA § 78f-3(a) (2000); Mathews, supra note 34, at 314.
94. Mathews, supra note 34, at 315. Mathews points out that speeding the
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In addition to qualitative descriptions of permitted activities, the
FCPA exemption has an unwritten quantitative limitation as well.
Payments over $1,000 are generally considered to be highly problematic
at best, and will almost certainly attract close attention during any
investigation. Though there is no textual support for this limitation in the
statute, most practitioners accept that this limitation exists. 95 While these
parameters are not ironclad, they do allow a general view of the types of
payments included under the FCPA exemption, and permit some
discussion of different ways to classify and consider the different
payments currently allowed.
A first approach to subdividing different types of FCPA allowed
payments would focus on which payments were "moral" and which were
not. The attractiveness of this general approach is simple: as long as no
specifics are mentioned, it permits all who consider this classification to
stigmatize only those payments they see as harmful. For example,
businesspeople could imagine this classification tolerating payments in
cases where perishable goods would rot unless a corrupt official was
given a small payment to allow the goods ashore, while frowning on
those who delay everyone else's visa applications by monopolizing an
official's time with their own employees' issues. In a more general
sense, the moral differentiation would often give a free pass to bribe
payers who otherwise face significant losses through no fault of their
own (e.g. officials who refuse to work as they are supposed to until they
are bribed), while punishing those whose bribes have negative
consequences for others. In theory, this kind of differentiation is very
justifiable-punishing those who try to improve conditions at the
expense of others, while supporting those who are simply trying to do
business in a difficult environment and face significant losses if they do
not conform to local expectations.
The problem with the moral approach is twofold. Firstly, there will
be strong disagreements about what is "moral." Some commentators
would argue that contributing to a culture of corruption is immoral, in
essence eliminating all bribes.
Other groups might consider the
intentions of those paying and receiving the bribes. Less ambitious
planners would only punish actions that had a direct negative impact on
others, whatever the impact on an overall culture. But even if this
disagreement were resolved in favor of the last category, it would be
enormously difficult to distinguish which payments had the negative
processing of certain applicants almost inevitably leads to discretionary choices about
whose documents should be processed first. He also disagrees with the rationale of the
DOJ lawyers who responded to this hypothetical. This disagreement illustrates the
continuing confusion that the FCPA exemption can cause.
95. Compare FCPA § 78dd-l(b) (2000) with Mathews supra note 34, at 315, n.22.
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consequences the law targeted. For example, in the case of payments for
expedited document processing, it would be hard to determine whether
an official was slowing the processing of others' documents or simply
putting in extra work. In some senses, the FCPA exemption's current
emphasis on "routine governmental action" already tries to make this
"moral" distinction between officials choosing one applicant over
another and simply "doing their job." Continuing ambiguity over what
can be counted in this category underscores the fact that any kind of
"moral" distinction between facilitation payments would be very hard to
codify or enforce.
A different approach to differentiating the payments currently
allowed by the FCPA would concentrate on more concrete issues than
morality-making distinctions between the different categories of
service for which facilitation payments are made. The attractiveness of
this approach is that the apparently distinct nature of service categories
theoretically permits clearer guidance about which payments are allowed
(and clearer debate about what circumstances deserve an exemption and
which do not). One way of considering different categories of action is
using the four basic categories of "routine governmental action"
identified by the FCPA: obtaining permits and similar documents;
processing government papers like visas; providing services like police
protection, mail delivery and the like; and providing utilities, loading/
unloading cargo and protecting perishable goods.96
It could be argued that the latter two categories in the FCPA
definition are very different from the two former ones. Police protection
and utility provision can be crucial to the health and safety of affected
businesses' employees, and the delays of one corrupt official who refuses
to protect perishable goods can lead to entire shipments being ruined,
with serious economic consequences. In addition, in theory at least,
providing utilities and police protection does not directly harm other
potential beneficiaries because the resources would have to be allocated
in some way anyway. Under this view, the payments' contribution to a
culture of corruption are the only real negatives-and this is a problem
best dealt with at a level that does not endanger health/safety or current
shipments of melting chocolates. On the contrary, some delays in
issuing permits do not directly endanger the health/safety of individuals
or cause immediate economic damage.
Still, these distinctions hold true only some of the time. Utility

96. FCPA § 78f-3(a) (2000). The distinctiveness of these categories could be
disputed. It would be easy to envision a scenario where utility provision and police
protection are intimately connected with the processing of government papers and the
issuance of appropriate permits.
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provision, for example, is not an infinite resource and providing it to
foreign investors and the like can often mean that other (often poorer and
more vulnerable) consumers receive less. Thus, choosing to provide
electric power to the district where foreign investors have their houses
and offices can mean that poorer regions of the city are provided with
less power. In the case of perishable goods, providing facilities to one
shipment can mean that another shipment does not receive the protection
it needs-meaning that some goods perish anyway. Additionally,
utilities and security can be privately provided for those with economic
power (e.g. buying an electric generator or hiring a security guard) while
documents like visas and export permits cannot be replicated by the
private sector (unless serious crimes like document fraud are committed).
Delays in issuing documents and permits can also cause significant
economic losses if they mean that machinery or other assets sit idle for
lack of spare parts, personnel or permission to operate-losses that could
be greater than the loss of a vegetable shipment.
The overall problem with trying to distinguish broad categories of
government service as more or less appropriate to facilitation payments
is that there are plausible counter-narratives to virtually any
classification. The specifics of any situation where bribes are paid are so
diverse that generalizations can fall flat on their face. While defining
different categories of "routine governmental action" is easier than
classifying these actions' "moral" consequences, it is very difficult to
justify a conclusion that facilitation payments are generally appropriate
to a category or not.
A third potential way of classifying facilitation payments does away
with any attempt to differentiate between different categories of
payment. Instead, it focuses purely on the amount paid, allowing
payments under a certain amount or percentage of a contract's value and
forbidding those over this amount.97 This proposal would expand the
FCPA's exemption in at least some ways, in the name of establishing
clear boundaries of what behavior would be allowed and what would not.
The clarity of this type of exemption seems preferable to the current
ambiguity concerning which payments are allowed and which are not.
But this differentiation ignores the large number of negative impacts that
even small scale corruption can have.9 8 In this sense, the easier
classification would be awarded at the expense of potentially increasing
the scope of activities where bribery would be allowed.
97. This classification has been proposed by a number of commentators. See, e.g.,
Moody-Stuart, supra note 62, at 59-60 (suggesting amounts of $20,000 or less);
Mathews, supra note 34, at 315, n.22 (quoting a Congressman who unsuccessfully
proposed a $5,000 or $10,000 limit).
98. See supra Section IV and the previous discussion in this Section.
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Beyond the immediate moral and practical difficulties caused by
expanding the range of unpunished corruption, establishing either a
dollar or percentage of contract limit could have perverse side effects. In
both cases, it could lead to implicit international recognition of
"permissible" bribe levels, potentially increasing the predictability of
bribe costs but also making it much harder to eliminate in the long-run
(and risking the spread of the new "standard"). A dollar limit risks
holding large business contracts to more stringent standards than smaller
ones (as a dollar limit would be a higher percentage of smaller contracts
than larger ones). This might be seen as a benefit (as larger investors
theoretically can resist pressure to bribe more easily than smaller
investors), but it is a broad policy choice with consequences and
potential side effects that require serious consideration.99
A final potential classification would attempt to differentiate
between small scale bribes on the basis of the likelihood that this type of
corruption would lead to larger scale corruption. Thus, bribes that would
lead to demands for larger payments or demands for payments from
others would be banned, whereas small facilitation payments that simply
maintained the status quo would be allowed. Obviously, bribes that
cause additional losses to other investors are more harmful than bribes
that simply contribute to the maintenance of a given level of corruption.
The major challenge to classifying bribes that lead to additional
corruption is not in the use of the category but in its derivation. It would
be very hard to prove in a court (or even outside a court) whether a bribe
maintained the status quo. Theoretically, bribes that were higher than
average or provided in a sector not known for bribery would be the main
targets. But, identifying the average bribe for a comparable transaction
is a very specific data point. While general testimony on this subject
might be obtainable, it would be hard to corroborate. The same holds
true when defining sectors where corruption existed or did not. Given
the difficulties encountered in proving corruption abroad anyway,
subdividing corrupt payments by potential to harm seems like a lost
cause-and ignores culpability for supporting a corrupt status quo. The
general principle that the harm caused by bribes should be considered
can of course be one factor taken into account, but the place for this
consideration is probably a prosecutor's office, when decisions about
which cases to devote resources to are made.
Most potential subdivisions of the low-level administrative bribery

99. Theoretically, this could push private companies to engage in only low-level/low
value contracts in developing countries in order to decrease the probability of legal
liability for bribery--or alternatively channel multiple bribes just under the FCPA's new
limits.
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currently permitted by the FCPA are either relatively easy to classify
bribes into or would be useful categories to consider, but none actually
meet both criteria. Categories that would be particularly useful in
amending the FCPA's current exemption for low-level administrative
payments-like the degree to which a given bribe might encourage
additional corruption-are particularly subjective and difficult to assess.
Categories marked by relatively clear boundaries-like the type of
service purchased-are not clearly differentiated in terms of the harm
they cause. In this sense, it seems more efficient and fairer to ban all
administrative bribery, given the fact that there are some negative
consequences associated with all of these payments. Prosecutors could
then use their discretion to address the most egregious cases in whatever
form they presented themselves.' 00
VI. Amending the FCPA
Given both the corrosive impact of administrative corruption, its
deleterious impact on the United States' role as an anti-corruption
crusader, and the difficulties inherent in trying to separate out less
harmful low-level administrative payments, the FCPA's exemption for
"grease" payments should be eliminated. The United States should also
take a lead in lobbying for the OECD anti-corruption treaty to be
amended in a similar fashion. This proposal will almost certainly help to
reduce the amount of administrative corruption in countries outside the
United States. On an immediate level, general corporate compliance
policies will almost certainly be changed to reflect the new legal
framework. Though this will certainly not solve the problem, it will be a
significant step in changing practices surrounding administrative
corruption. More broadly, the attack on administrative corruption could
be the basis of renewed efforts to attack corruption in general. The
United States' effort to have other countries sign the OECD anticorruption convention helped spur the increasing disapproval of
corruption exemplified by the work of Transparency International and
the World Bank's increased emphasis on tackling corruption. United
States firms will certainly lobby their government to pressure other
countries to take similar steps to crack down on administrative
corruption. Freed from the shackles of its current hypocritical laws, U.S.
100. Giving prosecutors discretion brings up additional issues relating to their
potential biases. But, as the discussion in this section indicates, the most harmful kinds
of corruption can be found scattered across any of the categories low-level administrative
corruption could realistically be subdivided into. Criminalizing only some of these
categories would be a relatively random attack that would reach only some of the most
harmful corruption. Ensuring that prosecutorial discretion is widely used is a broader
challenge for society that goes beyond the specifics of this proposal.
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rhetoric and pressure might be even more effective, and could eventually
help lead to large reductions in administrative corruption on a global
level.
Removing the FCPA exemption for "grease" payments will lead to
tangible benefits. Most directly, it will provide U.S. companies
operating abroad with a weighty reason for refusing to pay administrative
bribes, providing additional assistance in avoiding payments that World
Bank research suggests have little or no benefit in the long term for
private corporations.' 0 Broader international action on.the issue could
provide an impetus for reducing the leeway of bureaucrats everywhere to
exert pressure for additional rents from firms. Removing the clause from
the FCPA will also increase pressure on the U.S. government to become
even more involved in reducing corruption worldwide while improving
its effectiveness at the task.
Of course, removing the exemption for "grease" payments will lead
to real inconveniences for U.S. companies, especially in the short term.
Additional concerns that will need to be addressed include: questions
about how bans on low-level payments can be enforced; whether this
type of rule will deflect U.S. investors from "high bribe" countries;
whether this type of ban is so sweeping as to ignore non-western cultural
traditions; and whether the ban would in other ways skew current bribery
patterns in a way that made it even more harmful than currently. Some
of the objections-especially those centered on short-term business
impairment and enforceability-are valid and problematic, but they can
be addressed in a way that reduces some of the negative impact. More
broadly however, these objections are not sufficient to outweigh the
tangible, long-term benefits of removing the "grease" money exception
from the FCPA.
A.

Benefits

One of the most immediate benefits of eliminating the FCPA
exemption clause will be reduced administrative bribery on the part of
U.S. companies. The FCPA exemption will provide additional support
for corporate "no bribery" policies and also provide a reasonable
explanation for refusing to engage in administrative bribery both
externally and internally. Externally, companies will be able to provide a
comprehensible explanation to corrupt bureaucrats about why they refuse
to provide administrative bribes. Instead of referring to obviously illenforced written domestic laws or corporate level policies, they will be
able to refer to the danger of prosecution by the United States. Given the
101.

Hellman et al., supra note 69, at 19.
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fact that bureaucrats opportunistically engage in rent-seeking behavior
that maximizes returns rather than responding to firm level pressure for
changes, possessing an excuse for not bribing may decrease the overall
level of bribe collection. More broadly, any leeway still available in
internal policies written to comply with external laws will be removed,
making official company policies even more stringently opposed to
corruption.
A second positive impact of removing the FCPA exemption will be
to empower employees of large companies to actively refuse
participation in administrative corruption. Whereas previously they
might be cowed by explanations of "local tradition" and the fact that the
bribes are not illegal under U.S. law, removing the exemption will
provide them with a concrete reason to refuse participation in this type of
administrative corruption: it could expose them to criminal prosecution
in the United States. Providing rationales like these might look like a
relatively artificial construct for reducing bribery, but each additional
rationale that helps companies and individuals refuse to participate in
bribery can make the difference in reducing at least some administrative
corruption.
The broader and more general benefit of removing the FCPA
exemption will be the possibility of reinforcing current anti-corruption
activities at a global level. As discussed previously, the United States
and the FCPA in particular have been leaders in the anti-corruption
struggle. Their ability to be more effective against the whole range of
corruption should not be underestimated. More specifically, the United
States will almost certainly pressure other countries to both amend the
OECD Convention to remove the exemption for administrative
corruption contained there, and will lobby other countries individually to
stop their firms from paying "grease" money. United States firms, as
they did in the case of the OECD Convention, 10 2 will certainly pressure
their government to engage in this type of lobbying. With full United
States engagement, there is a real chance that other governments and
international institutions will join in a crackdown on administrative
corruption. Given the significant absence of long-term benefits found by
economic surveys, 10 3 any reductions in corruption would be a significant
global benefit to all parties except corrupt civil servants.
The benefits of cracking down on administrative corruption may not
be limited to this type of payment. Legally demanding a wholesale ban
on any corrupt payments, rather than creeping around painstaking
102. See, e.g., George et al., supra note 41, at 495-96; David E. Sanger, Business
Bribes to Foreignersto be Banned by End of 1998, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1997, at 33.
103. See, e.g., Wei supra note 1.
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exemptions ("grease" payments under $1,000 for example) could create a
more robust anti-corruption culture on the part of both governments and
international institutions.
Anti-corruption rhetoric and action is
particularly steeped in moral disapproval,' °4 which makes any deviation
particularly noticeable. Anti-corruption messages backed by coherent
legal frameworks should be much more convincing when they are not
littered with caveats and exemptions. Thus, eliminating the exemption
could improve not just the effectiveness of campaigns against low-level
administrative bribes, but also reduce all types of corruption, including
the high-level payments originally targeted by those who passed the
FCPA.
A final potential positive impact of eliminating the FCPA
exemption clause is the possibility that U.S. companies will work harder
to eliminate administrative corruption in countries where they operate.
Under current regulations, un- or under-enforced local corruption laws
can be ignored in the case of low-level administrative bribes, with lowlevel administrative corruption tolerated as a simple "additional cost" of
doing business. If U.S. companies suddenly find that the potential costs
of paying these "low-level" bribes increases, they will have additional
incentives to work towards eliminative administrative corruption.
Especially in countries where U.S. multinationals have a significant
presence, they can use their influence to encourage the adoption and
enforcement of anti-corruption programs helping to level any uneven
playing field created when foreign rivals are subject to less stringent
OECD Convention regulations. 10 5 While the companies' direct interest
may be limited to reducing demands for payments on themselves, many
actions they could take to reduce this pressure would have positive
benefits on other government service users. This is especially the case in
situations where
U.S. multinationals are significant actors in specific
06
economies. 1
B.

Immediate Challenges
The most significant challenge to efforts to curb the type of

104. See, e.g., Clinton Speech, supra note 87; Brock, supra note 87.
105. Hopefully, this imbalance will be swiftly ended by an amendment to the OECD
Convention. But at least in the short term, the imbalance will be an extra spur to
encourage U.S. companies to develop programs that target small scale administrative
corruption.
106. There is also the possibility that this kind of pressure will simply lead to
additional payment demands being leveled on foreign investors facing less restrictive
laws in their own home countries. But, any such pressure may lead to these same
companies supporting legislative reform to criminalize the payment of even low-level
administrative bribes-a positive side effect to a side effect.
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administrative bribery covered by the FCPA exemption is that it will
prove extremely difficult to operate in countries within which petty
corruption is endemic. The potential reduction in investment might hurt
not only U.S. investors and businesses, but also developing countries
whose economic development may be slowed by a reduction in foreign
investment. It is undoubtedly true that U.S. companies and their
employees will face significant inconvenience in the short and medium
term when complying with the newly stringent regulation. There is also
the question of what will happen in extreme circumstances where
employees are faced with death or serious injury unless they make a
payment. But as will be discussed below, the inconvenience facing U.S.
companies from ending administrative bribes of $1,000 or less is a
significant but not insurmountable obstacle, and one that does not
outweigh the real benefit flowing to both corporations and individual
societies from an eventual reduction in administrative corruption.
While administrative delays can be frustrating and inconvenient, it
is unlikely that a large number of projects/business deals would be
destroyed by the criminalization of payments currently covered by the
FCPA exemption. The exemption for "grease" payments is generally
considered to apply only to payment of $1,000 or less. 10 7 While this can
be a large amount of money in some developing countries, it is not likely
to be a large sum relative to the size of most American business deals
abroad. Given the size of most business deals involving U.S. companies
outside the United States, most are unlikely to be completely cancelled
simply because of the delays a $1,000 bribe would have prevented. If
the project really is dependent on such a slim reed, its problems probably
are based on much more than administrative delays.
Increased frustration, delays and monetary losses to certain
investors are the more likely result of the repeal of the FCPA exemption.
In some cases, the sum total of these will be so great that projects will be
cancelled. But this type of cancellation seems much less likely than
cancellations resulting from the ban on large-scale bribery of foreign
government officials. Not paying millions of dollars to win a bid for
government procurement is more detrimental to a project's chances than
a refusal to pay an occasional customs bribe. In many senses, the United
States has already made the decision that it is willing to risk real shortterm losses to its firms by ending most types of bribes. Extending this to
the more minor consequences resulting from a failure to pay small bribes
is only consistent.'0 "
107.

See Avi-Yonah supra note 10, at 19.

108. This does not mean that, in the short term, those adhering to these policies will
not face major aggravation. Everything from setting up utilities to getting permits will
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Additionally, firms that develop reputations for not bribing often
find that they are less pressured to make corrupt payments than would
otherwise be the case.' 0 9 While in the short term, U.S. corporations and
their employees will certainly be inconvenienced by not abiding by local
bribe paying norms, they may eventually benefit from a reduction in
pressure to pay bribes if they adhere to the new FCPA consistently. This
obviously benefits larger investors with repeated investor patterns more
than smaller, newer investors, but it is still a significant potential benefit.
A potential objection to the payment of small bribes is the
possibility that those who pay them may face explicit or implicit threats
of death or injury unless they make small payments at roadblocks etc. in
developing countries. But in a situation like this, where there is a threat
of physical violence, the payment is not actually a bribe; rather, it is
robbery. Additionally, the SEC and the DOJ are unlikely to prosecute
payments like these, especially if the circumstances are carefully
documented and honestly represented.
A second set of concerns about eliminating the FCPA exemption
centers on enforcement issues, especially focused on how the United
States could ever hope to track or punish low-level payments in diverse
foreign countries by individuals who may be employed very indirectly by
U.S. companies.11° Almost certainly, the vast majority of infractions
take extra time. Nevertheless, aggravation and delays for U.S. citizens and their
employees in the short term seems to be an acceptable price to pay for the benefits of
reducing corruption.
109. For example, Texaco has developed such a strong reputation in Africa for
refusing to bribe that its jeeps are routinely waved through border crossings at which
other vehicles are stopped and pressured for bribes. See Philip M. Nichols, How Bribery
and Other Types of Corruption Threaten the Global Marketplace (U. of Pa.), available at
http://www.ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/24835.htnl (last visited July 14, 2006).
110. One official, who wished to remain anonymous and who previously worked on
FCPA prosecutions at the DOJ, has rhetorically asked: "Do you really believe that our
limited federal criminal enforcement resources should be deployed to against this kind of
corruption?," E-mail from name withheld to Alexandros Zervos (Feb. 2, 2005) (on file
with law review). This skepticism about the feasibility/desirability of these prosecutions
is addressed, however, in the sections examining the damage caused by facilitation
payments and the negative symbolic and practical impact of the FCPA exemption. The
official also questions whether any national government would accept that these types of
small payments constitute a bribe worth punishing. This question is answered by
Luxembourg's government, which explained that "[t]he new articles of the Criminal
Code relating to bribery do not include the term 'undue' contained in the OECD
Convention." The result, according to the Luxembourg authorities, is to make so-called
"facilitation" payments an offense under Luxembourg law. The Luxembourg authorities
considered that including the word "undue" in its domestic legislation would mean that
facilitation payments or petty gifts were tolerated. Instead of fighting bribery more
effectively, the law would in fact be looking on it more indulgently because it would
accept that certain practices, although harmful, would no longer fall within the scope of
the law. Luxembourg considers that this would be a step backward in the fight against
bribery and how it is perceived. In the opinion of the Conseil d'Etat, "it would be
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probably will go unpunished. But, it is definitely possible that the ban on
administrative payments would at least in some cases be enforceable. In
the past, the U.S. government has amassed information about routine
administrative bribery by its companies and their subsidiaries, 1 and
numerous routes for obtaining additional evidence could be imagined,
including: disgruntled employees, tax and accounting audits, and the
like. '
It is also important to keep in mind that the actual enforcement of a
ban on administrative bribery is not the only standard by which the
FCPA's reform should be measured. As discussed in section VI.A, one
of the major benefits of the change in the FCPA is the symbolic power of
the move, and the potential that it will spur further action against
corruption on a global level. The relatively sparse enforcement of this
rule would also be in line with the rest of the FCPA's provisions, which
have not been frequently invoked by the U.S. government. 1 3 Beyond the
bribery sphere, the United States has types of legislation dealing with
other behaviors occurring abroad where evidence is difficult to obtain,
but the general moral point is considered to be sufficiently important to
justify the legislation." 14 Given the harm caused by corruption in general
and administrative bribery in particular, removing the FCPA exemption
seems to qualify for this type of moral gesture.
A third area of concern around removing the FCPA exemption
focuses on the possibility that foreign investment will be deflected from
countries with high levels of administrative bribery to ones with lower
levels, in order to reduce both aggravation and bureaucratic delays for
companies and their employees. It is certainly true that countries with
115
high levels of corruption see a reduction in their foreign investment.
But the proposed change to the FCPA, as discussed above, is not so
radical that it is likely to be a deciding factor in choices about where to
target investment. It is more likely that the high level of administrative16
corruption and the extra losses in terms of time and energy this causes'
will deflect companies from investing in countries with high levels of
inconsistent to tolerate facilitation payments while at the same time criminalising other
payments because they involved larger sums of money" (citation omitted). OECD,
LUXEMBOURG: PHASE 1 REPORT 5 (2001).
111. See Mathews, supra note 34, at 365-66.
112. Many of the techniques currently used to detect bribery could be extended to
cover the low-level administrative bribes covered by the FCPA exemption. See, e.g.,
Mathews, supra note 34.
113. See id.
114. See Karene Jullien, The Recent InternationalEffort to End Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Children, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 579, 580 (2003).
115. See Wei supra note 1, at 9.
116. See Hellman et al., supra note 69, at 19.
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administrative corruption. The practical impact of the change in the
FCPA rules is unlikely to be a central cause of any deflection.
A fourth set of concerns triggered by amending the FCPA focuses
on the possibility that the change will in some sense be culturally
imperialist or an imposition of western values/ways of doing business on
other countries. Under this scenario, the high- level bribes banned by the
FCPA could be considered to be corrupt from any perspective, while the
low-level bribes currently exempted are much more closely related to
some traditions of gift-giving and the like. Forcing U.S. companies to
comply with the FCPA on this scenario would be that their local
subsidiaries and business partners in other countries would be forced to
change their traditional business ways to suit U.S. moral crusading.
While avoiding cultural imperialism is important, the concern about
the cultural imperialism inherent in action against bribery is misplaced,
even in the case of small scale payments. Numerous authors, many
different types of corruption, have documented that perceptions of
corruption are remarkably similar across cultures and regions, with the
line between bribery and gift-giving much clearer than might be
supposed. 1 7 More specifically, the FCPA applies specifically to
payments that contravene written local laws in other countries. 18 While
it might be argued that these laws may not reflect traditional ways of
doing business or common cultural understandings, it is both
complicated and potentially presumptuous for U.S. politicians or
businesspeople to differentiate which local laws they will choose to
respect. Instead, it is appropriate to respect other countries' official
determinations of which types of payments constitute corruption and
which do not.
A final area of concern involves potential unwanted side effects
from amending the FCPA to eliminate low-level administrative bribes.
Theoretically, the elimination of the "grace zone" for low-level bribes
might motivate those firms that choose to break the law to provide larger
and/or more frequent bribes. In this view, by extending criminalization
to acts that many consider legitimate, the U.S. government would lessen
the inhibitions against pursuing broader ranges of criminal activity.
However, while this impact is certainly important to consider, the
FCPA's ban on payments that are already illegal in the country in which
they are made means that those actors affected have already chosen to
break the law in at least one jurisdiction. Once this decision is made, the
impact of additional enforcement by U.S. authorities does not seem so
117. See, e.g., Wei, supra note 1,at 14-16.
118. FCPA § 78dd-l(c)(1) (2000) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(c)(1) (2000) (for domestic
concerns); § 78dd-3(c)(1) (2000) (for "any person").
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great as to invalidate the real benefits that amending the FCPA to
exclude low-level administrative payments would bring.
C. Broader Challenges
Beyond the immediate challenges to eliminating the FCPA
exemption, a broader concern involves the allocation of resources to this
effort. Many critics feel that the FCPA's overall impact has been very
modest at best, with few indications that U.S. firms are less engaged in
bribery of foreign officials than those of other developed countries. 119
Any proposal to tighten the FCPA further must address the accusation
that this initiative will at best be "more of the same," and at worst divert
precious resources from more effective anti-corruption efforts to
Countering this criticism requires
meaningless moral posturing.
consideration of the FCPA's current impact, its potential impact should it
be amended, and the resources required for the amendment proposal to
succeed.
The most fundamental criticism of attempts to eliminate the FCPA
exemption for administrative bribery is that this effort is an ineffective
use of anti-corruption resources. This critique does not necessarily
question the negative impact of bribery in general or administrative
payments in particular. Instead, it focuses on the current perceived
failures of the FCPA-both its relatively light enforcement, 20 and its
(potentially linked) alleged lack of success in making U.S. firms less
corrupt than their competitors. This critique might outline other anticorruption projects more deserving of campaigners' time and energysuch as providing additional education and support to foreign officials
drafting local anti-bribery
laws, and voluntary guidelines for
12
multinational corporations. '
Criticism of the FCPA is fair in suggesting it has not led to as much
of a reduction in bribery of foreign officials as might have been hoped.
But the legislation has certainly had an impact in changing at least some
behavior by U.S. businesses-a fact slyly acknowledged by critics who
122
list "increased costs to U.S. business" as one of their main concerns.
More broadly, the global adoption of the OECD Convention is concrete
proof of both the FCPA's attractiveness as a global standard, and the
U.S. government's lobbying power when it seeks to "level the playing
field" for U.S. corporations. These facts suggest that both the practical
and symbolic benefits of the FCPA are greater than the critics would
119. See, e.g, Hellman et al., supra note 69, at 6.
120.
121.
122.

See Mathews, supra note 34, at 305; Eaton supra note 34, at D2.
See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 33, at 286.
See Salbu, supra note 33; Hines, supra note 15, at 17.
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suggest.
Devoting additional energies to amending the FCPA would
definitely require significant time and attention from the anti-corruption
community. But, the benefits of this amendment would not be limited to
changes in the law's text alone. A new campaign advocating the repeat
of the FCPA's exemption for administrative bribery could increase the
public profile of anti-corruption efforts, putting additional pressure on
national governments to emulate U.S. action, or at least enforce their
existing laws more seriously. As discussed in Section VII, a welldeveloped penalty scheme for low-level administrative payments could
result in increased enforcement of the FCPA-again increasing the
public profile of anti-corruption efforts. Most broadly, campaigns that
highlight anti-corruption activity aren't necessarily a zero sum game.
Instead, a campaign to change the FCPA could help global anticorruption efforts by persuading governments and other organizations to
increase anti-corruption funding and activities. Repealing the FCPA
exemption is hardly a panacea for all 'the world's corruption problems,
but the potential practical and symbolic benefits of the repeal justify the
resources anti-corruption campaigners would need to devote to achieve
this legislative change.
VII. Creating an Effective Penalty and Enforcement Mechanism
The conclusion that low-level administrative bribes should be
criminalized in line with other types of bribery outside the United States
does not mean that the penalty schemes in all cases should be identical.
In fact, given the very real problems with current FCPA enforcement and
impact currently documented, 123 a different enforcement approach to
Considering the
low-level administrative bribes is appropriate.
differences between large and small scale bribery, a graduated system
that encourages voluntary compliance and higher awareness by senior
company officials is most appropriate. Domestic U.S. efforts to halt
bribery in corrupt labor unions provides one model on which these
awareness and voluntary compliance efforts might be based. All these
different penalty approaches need to be combined with a variety of
enforcement means to overcome the difficulties of monitoring criminal
behavior outside the United States.
A.

Distinct Characteristicsof Small Scale AdministrativeBribery

As the current FCPA exemption suggests, low-level administrative
bribery is not like other types of bribery. While their negative impact is
123.

See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 33.
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difficult to dispute, these bribes have several characteristics that are
different from the high-level international bribery originally targeted by
the FCPA. By definition, low-level administrative bribery involves only
small amounts of money per transaction, so that it is much easier (e.g.
cheaper) to pay a large number of these bribes. Again on its own terms,
the FCPA's exemption covers bribes to promote routine government
action, which suggests that the actions are repetitive (more so, at least,
than one-off events like contracts for items such as purchases of military
equipment), and thus that these bribes are as well. In short, small scale
administrative bribery involves a large number of discrete "minor" acts,
rather than a few large scale and/or one-off payments.
The relative prevalence and relatively low importance (in monetary
terms) of individual acts of administrative bribery have several
consequences. There is a higher likelihood that an act of actual bribery
will be observed by parties outside the transaction because of the larger
number of parties involved and the large number of discrete acts that run
the risk of being observed. Conversely, individual low-level bribes are
much easier to hide within larger accounting items; the small size of the
bribes makes the accounting discrepancies much more minor. Explicit
authorization for low-level bribery is likely to come at lower levels in
companies than larger bribes would because the individual impact of
specific payments is much lower, and thus may be harder to monitor
centrally. Overall, the cumulative effect of low-level administrative
bribery is the primary reason for banning the practice. Individual
payments of small amounts of "grease" money are less harmful than
individual payments of large structural bribes.
B. AppropriatePenaltiesfor Low-Level Bribery
Currently, potential criminal penalties for individuals convicted of
bribery under the FCPA include the possibility of a prison sentence of up
to five years and fines of up to $100,000. Corporations have received
fines in excess of $2,000,000.124 When compared to large scale bribery,
the structural differences suggest that low-level administrative bribes
should be punished by a different type of penalty scheme, focusing on
the cumulative harm caused by repeated provision of small bribes.
Especially given that policies on low-level corruption would be
criminalizing previously legal behavior, a penalty scheme that provides a
"safe harbor" incentive for declaring and remedying past practices
should be considered. In addition, first offenses should be treated lightly,
perhaps with a probation/monitoring scheme similar to that adopted for
124.

See Perkel, supra note 11, at 702.
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some American labor unions facing corruption charges. In the long term
however, repeated violations of the law should trigger penalties just as
harsh as those punishing large individual payments. Finally, lax
policies/multiple convictions for low-level administrative bribery should
be explicitly identified as an indicator of broader corporate honesty
additional investigations/
automatically trigger
problems-and
runs
the risk of lessening the
supervision. While this differential scheme
symbolic message of making low-level administrative bribes illegal, the
potential benefits outweigh the risks.
A graduated penalty scheme that allows high-level private sector
executives to uncover and change low-level bribe giving practices would
probably be the most effective means of reducing this type of corruption
rapidly (at least when relying on an FCPA-style law). This type of
incentive would ideally be conducted in two stages: a voluntary preenforcement phase, and a stricter phase after a first violation is
discovered. The experience of U.S. prosecutors using RICO statutes to
force changes in corrupt labor unions, and some current efforts by U.S.
companies to investigate criminal behavior by their employees, are
instructive with regard to the types of oversight programs that might be
implemented.
As discussed in Section VII.A, one of the characteristics of lowlevel administrative bribery is that approval for small bribes can be given
at lower levels of authority and hidden relatively easily in accounting
systems. In some cases, top executives may thus be genuinely ignorant
Any
about bribery, or at minimum unclear about its extent.
criminalization of low-level administrative bribery should provide a
period during which companies can conduct internal investigations of
low-level bribery practices, identify where they occur, and adopt plans to
combat the problem. If these investigations are recorded and reported to
the DOJ, a "safe harbor" provision should protect these companies from
This safe harbor provision will encourage fuller
prosecution.
investigation and accounting of low-level bribery (saving DOJ
resources), make the changing legislation more palatable for companies,
make it easier to implement (because they can conduct internal
investigations without worrying about unpleasant findings), and even
provide useful information about where low-level bribery typically
occurs (useful for monitoring future low-level bribery in all companies).
Even if companies do not take advantage of the safe harbor
provision, first offenses (or evidence of potential first offenses) should be
used to encourage full internal investigations and confessions rather than
simply leading to application of full penalties. Internal investigations
undertaken in lieu of prosecution under the FCPA would of course be
more stringent, potentially involving FBI/outside monitor participation
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rather than relying on self-reporting. The results could also lead to
symbolic fines, depending on the circumstances. But again, the overall
goal should be to establish strong, internal anti-bribery systems in
companies in order to ensure that top executives are able to monitor and
end the practice.
The monitoring of corrupt labor unions provides an example of the
success that these kinds of internal and external monitoring mechanisms
can have. Though unions are very different from commercial companies,
they share certain characteristics which make the comparison useful.
Most notably, they can be large organizations where top-level executives
are not always aware of wrongdoing at lower levels. They also faced a
new legal environment when the RICO statutes began to be applied to
union corruption, proving additional incentives to cooperate with federal
prosecutors in stamping out corruption.
One good example of success in efforts to clean up corruption
which might parallel efforts to comply with a safe harbor provision is
provided by the internal reform efforts of the Laborers Union
International of North America (LIUNA). In 1995, facing the possibility
of a civil racketeering lawsuit accusing it of being influenced by
organized crime, the union agreed with federal prosecutors to conduct its
own cleanup effort. 125 This involved hiring a former prosecutor and a
former inspector general to oversee internal anti-corruption efforts, 12 6 as
well as the removal of hundreds of corrupt officials. 2 7 This type of
internal effort at organizational change may be more effective than
simply punishing the organization as a whole; it involves top officials
(even ones with unclear ties to the corruption) making real efforts to
reform an organization in order to avoid the costs associated with
criminal prosecution. LIUNA's effort was enough to convince
federal
28
union.1
the
over
taking
of
option
the
up
give
to
prosecutors
The Teamsters are a second good example of monitoring/oversight.
While the LIUNA case parallels potential efforts to meet a safe harbor
requirement, the Teamsters' case is a good example of efforts in lieu of
conviction for an actual offense. The Teamsters accepted external
monitoring in 1989 to settle a federal racketeering lawsuit. This external
monitoring included paying for a government investigations officer and
dozens of investigators to go through the union and uncover instances of

125. Steven Greenhouse, Union Cleanup Praised,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2000, at A20
[hereinafter Union Cleanup].
126. Steven Greenhouse, Republicans Questioning Federal Deal with Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 14, 1996, at A14.
127. See Union Cleanup,supra note 126, at A20.
128. Id.
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corruption. 129 While the extent and length of this supervision (which
continues today) would not be applied in anti-corruption cases, the
successes of this external supervision in reducing Teamster corruption
suggests the potential for similar achievements when monitoring
businesses subject to prosecution for a first offense.
These types of internal and external investigations are not limited to
labor unions. Private companies routinely use lawyers and others to
investigate and report internal wrongdoing. For example, the global
investment company UBS appointed a law firm to investigate illegal
activity by lower level Swiss employees involving shipments of U.S.
currency to Iran and other countries facing sanctions. While UBS
received a hefty fine, it did not have to face criminal penalties because of
its internal investigations, which involved tracing and reporting all illegal
activity to federal authorities. 130 In addition to outside consultants,
companies with pre-existing structures for reporting and stopping bribery
could extend these structures to low-level bribes (if they were not already
covered).
After a first offense or "safe harbor period," penalties for repeat
offenders would need to be just as high as or higher than the current ones
targeting large-scale bribery. This "stick" would be essential for the
success of (and participation in) self-change programs on the part of
affected companies. The labor union and UBS examples previously
discussed were impelled by the fear of federal prosecution and the high
penalties that would entail. Without this fear, it is unlikely that a sense
of good citizenship alone would compel companies to route out and
report their legal infractions.
Instituting a legally binding penalty system that encourages internal
change would bring a number of benefits. The "internal reform" offered
in response to evidence of a first infraction would shield both the FCPA
and lawmakers from the allegation that they were jailing individuals and
disrupting developing countries' economies over a few tiny, one-off
payments. Repeat offenders with a public track record of illegality
would be much less sympathetic defendants. More practically, the grace
period for payments would allow companies to transition into the new
bribery framework without delaying the symbolic benefit of
criminalizing low-level administrative bribery. Those companies that
found themselves discussing first infractions of the law with the DOJ
would have strong incentives to tighten their corporate compliance

129. Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Push to End Decade of Supervision, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1999, at A5.
130. Timothy L. O'Brien, Lockboxes, Iraqi Loot and a Trail to the Fed, N.Y .TIMES,
Jun. 6, 2004, at Bus. 1.
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systems in order to avoid the higher penalties levied on repeat offenders.
On an operational level, a gradually increasing system of penalties
would provide incentives for actors across the spectrum to cooperate in
enforcing the FCPA more vigorously.
Though these operational
reactions would be hard to legally enforce, an appropriate penalty system
might lead to more enforcement than is currently the case. This is
especially the case for individuals who observe low-level administrative
bribery and those in the DOJ and SEC responsible for prosecuting under
the FCPA. As discussed above, low-level administrative bribes are more
likely to be observed than other types of bribes because of their
frequency. Individuals who observe these may be reluctant to report
them to U.S. authorities if prison sentences or serious fines could
result-not just out of concern for individuals paying bribes, but also
because of the impact these penalties would have on continued local
operations of affected companies. 13 If they were assured that first
offenses resulted in corporate cleanup efforts rather than fines/jail, they
might be more willing to provide information.
Lower penalty levels might also encourage U.S. officials in charge
of implementing the FCPA to be more aggressive in bringing
prosecutions. If officials were assured that any initial prosecutions
would not have ruinous effects on those prosecuted, they might be less
reluctant to bring additional cases, especially if provided with additional
information from NGO workers and other sources abroad. An increase
in prosecutions for low-level administrative bribery might also provide
the DOJ with additional resources for attacking other types of bribery by
allowing investigations of affected firms, and by providing an indication
of which firms might have a more general problem with bribery. In this
sense, low-level administrative bribery would function as a "canary in
the coal mine," providing first indications that there might be broader
bribery issues to watch for in specific firms.
The benefits of this alternative sentencing would obviously need to
be weighed against the possibility that codifying lower penalties for
some individual acts of administrative bribery could send the message
that they are "less important" than other types of bribery. While this is
definitely a possibility, the fact that all types of bribery will be
criminalized would still be the primary message of removing the FCPA
exemption. Any parties examining details like sentencing differentials
131. This concern would not be ill-founded. After the passage of the FCPA, U.S.
companies reduced business contacts with areas that had reputations for high levels of
bribery. See Hines, supra note 15, at 17. This withdrawal of business could result in
negative consequences for local economies, particularly in developing countriesmaking NGO workers and others reluctant to pass on rumors or other verifiable
information about low-level bribery.
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would almost certainly also understand that repeated administrative
bribery was punished just as harshly as other types of bribes. This
overall message-that the cumulative impact of administrative bribery is
even more significant than a sum of the individual acts of low-level
administrative bribery-very accurately reflects the corrosive effect of
"grease money."
C. Enforcement
In addition to codifying graduated penalty systems, making an
amended FCPA most useful will require special enforcement efforts
which take into account the difficulties of enforcing restrictions on
behavior outside the United States and the limited nature of the target
group. Most basically, the DOJ would need to make greater use of tools
it currently has for reducing corruption. More broadly, the DOJ and the
FBI will need to consider adding work on anti-corruption to the remit of
FBI agents stationed overseas. Finally, the DOJ should consider a more
active campaign to encourage whistleblowers-both within enterprises
engaging in corruption and from NGOs, lOs and other private companies
operating abroad. This combination of measures might seem chaotic, but
their overall weight could prove significantly more effective at enforcing
a revised FCPA than current efforts have been.
Any effort to enforce an amended (or indeed the current) FCPA
must take into account the unique nature of the crimes being committed.
Because the FCPA criminalizes bribery conducted entirely outside the
United States, U.S. enforcement agencies have much less freedom to
operate than they otherwise would. Many actions easily accomplished in
the United States-like wiretapping-are much more difficult to arrange
overseas. In addition, unlike bribery statutes within the United States,
only those paying the bribes-not those receiving them-are subject to
penalties. These limits on the scope of both the legislation and the means
of enforcement inevitably reduce the ability of the DOJ to enforce the
FCPA.
These difficulties may be a partial explanation for the relatively low
levels of FCPA enforcement. Nonetheless, good use of current FCPA
enforcement tools can lead to prosecutions. As discussed, the accounting
violations component of the legislation makes it easier to identify and
penalize bribery abroad. Though it may be harder to pinpoint individual
low-level bribes in company accounts, their repeated nature may make
identification easier. Additionally, the DOJ already conducts activities
overseas. It stations FBI agents in embassies all over the world, focusing
on cooperation with local law enforcement and following up foreign
leads in domestic cases. While these agents tend to focus on high-profile
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issues like counter-terrorism, 132 their remit could certainly be expanded if
the DOJ placed sufficient priority on anti-corruption efforts. Using
existing links with foreign security and police services, FBI agents
stationed overseas could gather evidence in at least some instances of
low and high-level bribery.
Beyond using existing resources and techniques,' 33 the DOJ would
also need to consider broader efforts to encourage witnesses to low-level
bribery to come forward. 134 The repeated nature of these actions
suggests a higher probability that at least some of them will be observed,
and these witnesses could be a key part of an anti-bribery arsenal. As
discussed in Section VII.B, the graduated penalty scheme could
encourage additional witnesses to come forward, secure in the
knowledge that they would not do multinationals major economic
damage.
In addition, the DOJ could consider providing useful
whistleblowers and other witnesses with reward payments similar to
those given for suspected terrorists. These payments have been effective
in encouraging informers to report other types of crimes and could be
useful for attacking corruption as well.13
These ideas for expanding enforcement of an amended FCPA
assume real interest on the part of an administration in eliminating lowlevel bribes of foreign officials. The long-run damage that this kind of
bribery causes to both developing countries and U.S. companies seems to
be sufficient evidence to justify the increase in enforcement activity.
But, given the rush of other priorities (and short term opposition from
businesses), any campaign for an amendment to the FCPA would need to
include efforts to monitor enforcement of the amended act to ensure that
innovative penalty systems and additional enforcement options are
actually used.
VIII. Conclusion
As the previous sections discuss, there are strong reasons for
amending the FCPA to eliminate the exemption for administrative
payments. This action not only addresses some of the concerns about the

132. See, e.g., Eric Eckholm, U.S. Official Praises China for its Cooperation in
Rooting Out Bin Laden's TerrorNetwork, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B5.
133. In its report to the OECD, the U.S. focuses almost solely on information
provided directly by other governments and on mutual assistance treaties. See OECD,
UNITED STATES: PHASE 2 REPORT 28 (2002).
134. This is already done to a certain extent by some countries. See, e.g., OECD,
SWITZERLAND: PHASE 2 REPORT 13-22 (2005) (including descriptions of prosecutions
based on whistleblowers and media reports).
135. See, e.g, Raymond Bonner, A Scramble in Bangkok for a $10 Million Reward,
N.Y. TIMES Sept. 15, 2003, at A11.
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FCPA's alleged ambiguities, 36 but also improves the strength and
consistency of the United States' global anti-corruption message.
Beyond the specifics of the FCPA, a number of larger questions remain
about broader legislation along the FCPA model. Still, these concerns
are not sufficient to override the need to amend the act, at least in the
current legislative context.
When considering the strength of global rhetoric about the evils of
corruption, it is surprising that exemptions like those found in the FCPA
and OECD conventions have persisted as long as they have. As
discussed in Section IV, the myth that low-level grease payments are less
significant has been put to rest by recent economic studies, as have the
broader arguments that attacks on corruption constitute cultural
imperialism. 37 The immediate rationale for amending the FCPA to
remove the exemption for low-level facilitation payments is both strong
and convincing.
On a macro level, three major questions hang over attempts to make
the FCPA stricter: whether corruption is the most important focus of
international resources; whether criminal legislation passed mostly for its
symbolic value is appropriate; and whether the U.S. and other developing
countries should thrust "pet" initiatives like this one onto developing
countries. The first challenge focuses on the broad range of international
problems and the limited resources available to tackle them (money,
time, etc.). Rules involving the business climate do not appear to
immediately address pressing issues like the AIDS crisis and the like.
But the economic costs of corruption, identified in numerous studies,
point to the major flaw in this criticism. Corruption's toll on developing
countries' economies and the poor who live there mean that it is a drag
on almost any type of international humanitarian effort-and that
attempts to reduce this corruption will positively impact all other
programs. Though the FCPA is focused on private businesses, the
reductions in overall corruption its amendment could achieve justify
significant a significant investment of resources.
A second macro question is whether criminal legislation passed
mostly for the symbolic value rather than as an effort to provide practical
tools to law enforcement is the right way to craft a system of legal
sanctions. Passing rarely enforced laws that are used for exemplary
purposes against only a few parties carries the potential for abuse and the
illegitimate targeting of political enemies. There are two responses to
this challenge. Most immediately, it could be argued that the challenges
of gathering evidence abroad means that practical, rather than political,
136.
137.

See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 37, at 874-77.
See supra Section VI.
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considerations result in limited prosecutions, reducing the scope for
abuse of power. More generally though, the decision to make use of
symbolic laws has already been made. From the FCPA as it currently
stands to rules about speed limits, U.S. society already possesses a
culture where laws are only selectively enforced and are passed more for
their symbolic purpose than their practical impact. Given this context,
the harm that low-level administrative corruption causes, and the very
real possibility that amending the FCPA will help change global laws
and attitudes towards low-level corruption, extending the scope of
symbolic lawmaking in this way seems both legitimate and useful.
A final question is whether developed countries like the United
States should even try to pass legislation basically aimed at "supporting"
pet initiatives in foreign countries (often developing ones). This effort
could be interpreted as patronizing, suggesting that other countries
cannot enforce their laws and that United States companies and
individuals are answerable only to their own government. In the
extreme, it could be taken as a suggestion that U.S. companies need only
follow local laws that the U.S. government supports through specific
legislation like the FCPA. But, though this macro level concern is
important, the harm caused by administrative corruption and its
prevalence despite local laws in certain countries provides at least partial
justification for laws like the FCPA. Additionally, it could be argued
that the United States has a right to regulate the behavior of its
representatives abroad, and that requiring extra respect for some types of
local laws is a domestically focused policy rather than an imperialist
effort. 138 Finally, as is the case with the second macro level objection,
the United States has already made the decision to regulate its citizens'
and firms' activities abroad. Given that the policy choice to deploy this
tool has been made, focusing on reducing administrative corruption
seems a particularly defensible decision given its deleterious impact.
The decision to amend the FCPA to make it fully consistent with
U.S. and international rhetoric and best practice involves bidding a final
farewell to well-worn cliches about how things "get done" in developing
countries. The FCPA as it currently stands is an important marker of the
gradual understanding that changing a culture of corruption involves not
just reforming bureaucrats but also consumers, businesses and
individuals. Through the FCPA, the United States has made active its
desire that it and its businesses take a lead in changing cultures of
corruption. Fortunately for the rest of the world, eliminating corruption
is an area where the United States' efforts to raise others to its own
138. Given the origins of the FCPA in U.S. outrage at domestic corporate corruption,
this seems a particularly convincing argument. See Posadas supra note 10, at 349-55.
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aspired standards are beneficial. Amending the FCPA to remove the
exemption for "grease" money would mark the completion of the
conceptual revolution that the FCPA's passage began-affirming that no
bribery, no matter what amount or for what purpose is acceptable for
U.S. corporations. Making current developed world rhetoric about
corruption consistent with its laws will in no way immediately solve this
problem, but it does have the potential to reenergize global anticorruption efforts while making them broader and more effective.

